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Siciliano: Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appear

NOTE

ATTORNEY CONTRIBUTIONS IN
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: CREATING THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
INTRODUCTION

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining
and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally
observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to
be construed and applied to further that objective.'

With these words begins the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(hereinafter the Code). As Canon 1 indicates, the purpose of the Code
is to ensure the integrity of the judicial system. However, one area in
which the Code seems to fall short is judicial elections. There has
been substantial debate concerning issues surrounding judicial elections.2 Much of that debate has centered on the issue of campaign

1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990) [hereinafter CODE]. Note that
judges are not only subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, but to the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers as well. In re Lawrence, 335 N.W.2d 456, 460 n.8 (Mich. 1983).
In 1990, the A.B.A. adopted a new Model Code of Judicial Conduct. To date, only
Wyoming has passed this new version, although twenty additional states are considering it.
Most of the cases and the analysis presented in this Note concern the 1984 version. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984) [hereinafter 1984 CODE]. Forty-seven states are still
guided by the 1984 version. The primary focus of this Note is on Canon 7B(2) of the 1984
Code, which was left substantively intact in Canon 5C(2) of the 1990 Code. Any substantive
changes between the 1984 and 1990 versions that affect this Note are so indicated.
2. See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial
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financing for judges Canon 5C(2) of the Code deals with this particularly troublesome issue:
A [judicial] candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign
A
contributions or personally solicit publicly stated support ....
candidate shall not use or permit the use of campaign contributions
for the private benefit of the candidate or others.4
Even more troubling than the notion of judicial campaign contributions are situations in which those contributions are made by members of the bar. Under Canon 5C(2) of the Code, members of the bar
are permitted to make contributions to candidates for judicial office.5
Such contributions raise serious questions concerning conflicts of
interest for judges. The distinction between judicial candidates and
other elected officials on this point is important to recognize. Judges
are expected to be impartial, while executives and legislators are
not.6 Furthermore, such contributions appear to be in direct conflict
with Canon 2B's requirement that judges avoid even the appearance
of impropriety. 7
This Note will examine the potential conflicts of interest that
arise when lawyers are permitted to contribute to judicial candidates.
Section I will examine the general campaign finance rules for judicial
office. 8 Section II will discuss the arguments for and against the
policy that allows lawyers to contribute to judicial campaigns, and
will examine some of the problems in implementing the Code, particularly the committee provisions.9 It will also look at some blatant
abuses of the present system and offer some suggestions as to why
they occur.' 0 Section III will first cover some of the proposals that
have been offered to deal with the problems of fund-raising in judi-

Election Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.. 671 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Leona C. Smoler & Mary A. Stokinger, Note, The Ethical Dilemma of
Campaigningfor Judicial Office: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.I. 353 (1986).
4. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 5C(2). The omitted portions of Canon 5C(2) will be
discussed in detail in the remainder of this Note.
5. Id. "Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and accepting reasonable
campaign contributions and public support from lawyers." Id. Contributions may be made to
both sitting judges and challengers. Id. at Canon 5E.
6. Victor J. Baum, Should Judges Know Who Gave to Their Campaigns?, 60 JUDICATURE 258, 259 (1977). For example, when one votes for either Jesse Helms or Jesse Jackson,
he is not seeking impartiality.
7. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 2B.
8. See Infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
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cial elections." It will then offer a proposal for the policy of recusal
when attorney contributors appear before a judge, with a focus on the
landmark case, Breakstone v. Mackenzie.

2

It will conclude with a

proposal to prohibit attorney contributions, and will briefly address
the issue of the constitutionality of such a proposal. 3
I.

FUND-RAISING FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

The problem of funding a judicial campaign presents one of the
greatest conflicts between political necessity and judicial impartiality-4 If a judicial candidate raises money for his campaign, his impartiality might be questioned as a result of his having received money and having entered into the political arena. If he tries to preserve
his integrity and maintain an appearance of impartiality by refusing to
raise funds, he is destined to lose the election.' 5 Canon 5C(2) tries
to deal with this inherent conflict through the establishment of campaign committees.
Under the Code, a candidate, including an incumbent judge, must
establish a campaign committee to solicit and receive campaign contributions since he may not solicit directly, or accept, such contributions.' 6 Furthermore, the candidate may not appoint himself to the

11. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
12. 561 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). See infra notes 131-73 and accompanying text; see also Celeste Hardee Muir, Breakstone v. Mackenzie: A Keystone Case for
Judicial Election Reform, 64 FLA. B.J. 34 (1990).
13. See infra notes 174-97 and accompanying text.
14. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Politics and Ethics in Electing Judges, CI. DAILY LAW BULL.,
Sept. 1, 1987, at 2 (quoting the Reporter for the Code of Judicial Conduct).
15. As Adlai Stevenson once said, "the hardest thing about any political campaign is
how to win without proving that you are unworthy of winning." Sheila Macmanus, 11th
National Conference Convened, Jun. CONDUCT REP., vol. 10, no. 3, at 1, 4 (1988).
16. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 5C(2). A judicial candidate "may . . . establish
committees of responsible persons to . . . solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign and obtain public
statements of support for his or her candidacy." Id.
One problem with the 1984 CODE was that only judges, and not their unsuccessful
challengers, were held to it. Mark A. Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to ImproprietiesArising
from Judicial Campaign Contributionsfrom Lawyers, 86 MtcH. L. REV. 382, 384 (1987); see
also CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 5E. Furthermore, judicial disciplinary agencies have
jurisdiction only over judges, and not their non-judge opponents, for ethical violations occurring during the campaign. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 680-81. In California, there is
no enforcement body with the authority and the inclination to enforce the CODE against nonincumbents. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 373. However, the Los Angeles Bar
Association did form an election committee to investigate complaints against judicial candi-
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committee, since this would circumvent the provision's goal of prohibiting personal solicitation on the part of the candidate.' 7
There are several purposes behind requiring the establishment of
campaign committees. The main purpose of this requirement is "to
insulate candidates from personal contact with contributors that may
lead to allegations of bias when a contributor appears before the
[recipient] judge."' 8 It is also intended to resolve the dilemma between the candidate's need to raise funds and his need to remain
unbiased.' 9 In addition, the committee is supposed to reduce the
pressures of campaigning for judicial office. 2°
Not only do committees keep candidates from contact with contributors, but they also work to shield candidates entirely from the
identity of contributors. To protect the candidate further against later
allegations of judicial impropriety, the 1984 Code recommends that
the names of the contributors not be revealed to the candidate.2'
This recommendation, combined with the requirement of a committee,
suggests that candidates are also prohibited from attending fund-raisers held on their behalf.22 However, this proposition has not been

uniformly accepted.' In addition, state disclosure rules have essentially rendered useless this aspect of the Code's policy of keeping
contributors' identities from judges' attention.24 All fifty states require the reporting of campaign contributions and the names of the

dates within seventy-two hours of their submission. State News: California, JUD. CONDUCT
REP., vol. 2, no. 1, at 5 (1980) [hereinafter State News]. The committee produced findings
within seven days and reported them to the candidates and the media. Id.
17. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 701. However, candidates are generally permitted
to solicit campaign contributions from immediate family members. Smoler & Stokinger, supra
note 3, at 360.
18. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 700.
19. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 356.
20. litIt is not entirely clear how the use of a committee reduces campaign pressures,
since even non-judicial candidates have committees.
21. 1984 CODE, supra note 1, at 7B(2) commentary: "Unless the candidate is required
by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the
candidate."; see also Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 356.
22, Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 360. In one instance, a judge sent a video
tape of himself to a fund-raiser held on his behalf, thanking all the attendants, and thereby
avoiding a breach of anonymity of contributors. Macmanus, supra note 15, at 3.
23. See, e.g., Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 716 (it has either been rejected or
excepted to). One survey showed that 74% of judges questioned felt that judges should be
permitted to attend fund-raisers. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 392.
24. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 719. Note that some judges have suggested that
they prefer disclosure so that they will be able to recuse themselves in cases in which a contributor appears before them. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 403.
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contributors whose donations exceed specified amounts.25 Perhaps as
a consequence of these disclosure laws, the 1990 Code does not
contain the requirement that candidates must be shielded from the
identities of their contributors. The revised Code ignores the issue of
whether candidates should know who their contributors are.
Finally, it is recommended that each jurisdiction set time limitations as to when solicitations for contributions may be made.26 The
Code recommends no earlier than one year before the election and no
later than ninety days after the election." Generally, in retention
elections, judges may not receive contributions unless there is an
active opposition.28 While the constitutionality of these time limitations has been challenged, they have been upheld.2 9
II.

ATTORNEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

A.

Arguments For Attorney Contributions

As stated above, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct permits
judicial campaign committees to solicit campaign contributions and
public support from members of the bar.3° Such contributions are
generally permitted even when the contributing attorney appears before the judge from time to time, so long as they are not so large as
to create the appearance of an expectation of preferential treatment. 31
Some jurisdictions permit such contributions even when the attorney
is before the judge at the time that the contribution is made, so long
as there is no stated quid pro quo.32 In fact, the local bar is often

25. Smoler & Stokinger,, supra note 3, at 374. In addition to professional standards in
elections, judges and lawyers are also subject to state statutes on campaign finance and other
related matters. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 3, at 679.

26. CODE, supra note 1, at 5C(2). "A candidate's committee may solicit contributions
and public support for the candidate's campaign no earlier than [one year] before an election
and no later than [90] days after the last election in which the candidate participates during
the election year." Id

27. Id However, some jurisdictions, such as Texas, place no time limits whatsoever.
Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 707.
28. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 704. A retention election requires an incumbent
judge to run unopposed, based on his or her record, to remain in office. David I. Papier,
Note, Insulating Incumbent Judges From the Vicissitudes of the Political Arena: Retention
Elections as A Viable Alternative, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 752 n.80 (1987). How "active
opposition" is defined remains unclear.
29. See, e.g., Judicial Qualifications Comm'n v. Lowenstein, 314 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 1984)
(upholding a six-month solicitation limitation).
30. CODE, supra note 1, at 5C(2). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 712.
32. Id. at 709.
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the most obvious place for judges to seek campaign funds, since
attorneys are more likely to come into contact with judges, both
professionally and socially. 3 It has even been suggested that such
activity on the part of attorneys is not only permissible, but should be
encouraged.4
There are several practical arguments in favor of allowing attorney contributions to judicial campaigns. The first is that the informed
opinions of attorneys should be brought to the public's attention, and
that the bar should actively show support for or against judicial candidates." It is said that attorneys are the best appraisers of judicial
candidates' qualifications, since it is they who work with the candidates.36 It is also argued that the contributions are often small in
dollar amounts and are made by many attorneys, and that they therefore pose no threat of prejudicing the judge.37 Finally, lawyers provide most of the contributions to judicial campaigns. 8 Consequently,
without attorney contributions, judicial candidates would have a more
difficult time raising sufficient amounts of money to inform the electorate adequately.39
While these arguments work logically to support allowing attorneys to contribute to judicial candidates, a fundamental philosophical
premise underlies permitting the practice; that is, the law should "not

33. Grannis, supra note 16, at 382-83.
34. Muir, supra note 12, at 34.
35. Id
36. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 709. Of course, this argument takes only litigators into account. However, this Note is generally concerned with litigators, since corporate
attorneys and tax attorneys do not stand to gain from contributing to a judge's campaign
because they most likely would not have to argue cases before the judge.
37. Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign
Contributors, 40 STAN L. REv. 449, 480 (1988). For example, if many attorneys that appear
before a certain court make $50 contributions, no one will believe that they were trying to
buy favor with the judge. IL Some judges even restrict themselves to small contributions
from attorneys. Shaman, supra note 14.
38. Grannis, supra note 16, at 416.
39. Id. While such reliance arguments are often made to justify accepting certain kinds
of contributions, e.g., Political Action Committee money, it has been shown that judges can
win without the usual avenues of support. In Chicago, a city known for its political machine,
thirty-five of thirty-eight judges running for re-election were successful despite their having
broken with their political parties, not having held individual fund-raisers, and not having
established campaign committees to raise funds. Mark A. Lyon, Chicago Judges Independent
Retention Effort Succeeds, JUD. CONDUCT REP., vol. 8, no. 3, at 1 (1986). Two of the
unsuccessful judges had been publicly cited as possible targets of federal investigations. IdU
The third unsuccessful judge was the target of a vigorous campaign against his election by
the police department. Id.
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suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already
sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly
depends upon that presumption and idea."40 "As long as [a] judge
avoids alliances with people and issues that would affect his objectivi41
ty, his qualifications to preside generally should be presumed.",
Supporters of attorney contributions accuse their opponents of
possessing a cynical attitude of distrust.42 They suggest that proper
motives should be ascribed to lawyers' support of judicial candidates.43 They argue further that prohibiting such contributions would
limit the freedom of association of lawyers. 44 Finally, they argue that
the political reality of judicial elections is that candidates must be
able to raise money in order to be elected.45
B. Holes and Modifications Weaken Code
While Canon 5C(2) might work in theory, reality has undermined
the Code's ability to ensure that no conflicts of interest will arise
when attorneys contribute to judicial campaigns. This has resulted
from lenient interpretations of the Code, as well as from local modifications of the Code.
Several parts of Canon 5C(2) have been loosely interpreted to
allow judges and contributors to partake in conduct that the Code, on
its face, seems to prohibit. To begin with, it is generally accepted that
lawyers may serve on a judge's election committee even though a
judge may not directly solicit his contribution. 46 If the Code prohib-

40. Pierce v. Charity Hosp., 550 So. 2d 211, 213 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).
41. Muir, supra note 12, at 35. Judges may find it in their best interest to avoid
contributions from ideological or issue-oriented groups. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at
712. Examples of these might be the John Birch Society or the American Civil Liberties
Union.
42. See Muir, supra note 12, at 36.
43. Id
44. Id at 35-36.
45. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 672. While it may appear that judges need
campaign contributions to run for office, this argument fails to account for the practice of
judges in some jurisdictions of giving their campaign funds to political parties that support
their candidacies instead of using the funds for their campaigns. Shaman, supra note 14. This
practice alone is questionable, conjuring up images of the political machines of Tamaney Hall
and Boss Tweed in New York City, and Joseph Margiotta in Nassau County. The practice
also shows that the contributions really are not necessary to run a campaign, since being
elected to judicial office has more to do with political affiliation and party loyalty. See infra
note 65.
46. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 701.
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its the judge from directly soliciting support, how could it then permit
an attorney to work for the judge's committee, campaigning and
soliciting? The judge will certainly be more aware of an attorney who
is playing a major role in running his campaign than of an attorney
who makes an average-sized contribution.
Another example of a loose interpretation of Canon 5C(2) comes
from an advisory opinion in Florida that interpreted the Code to
permit a judge to write a personal letter to an attorney, soliciting his
vote and his "active" support, but that prohibited him from asking
specifically for money or sending a return receipt.4" The line of distinction between money and support appears to be very thin. In fact,
support in many instances could be even more valuable than money.
For instance, an endorsement from a popular, high-profile attorney
could swing an election. In addition, such an attorney might have the
ability to draw the48 contributions of others, even though he does not
contribute himself.
Local rules also serve to frustrate the goal of shielding the judge
from possible conflicts of interest. In Michigan, there is a $100 limit
on solicited contributions from attorneys, but no limit on unsolicited
contributions.49 In Kentucky, there are time restrictions on solicited
contributions, but none on unsolicited ones. 50 Arizona's Code provides that candidates are to refrain from soliciting funds, but are
permitted to refer prospective contributors to their committees. 5' Another jurisdiction forbids a candidate from soliciting or accepting
contributions himself, but permits him to suggest sources to his committee. 5' Each of these local exceptions serves to defeat the purpose
of the main rule. The initial restriction is construed very narrowly to
enable an attorney to53give, and a candidate to receive, money outside
the prescribed limits.

47. Id. at 708 (citing Fla. S. Ct. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges,
Op. 78-1 (1978)). It is not clear whether the Committee was rejecting the distribution of a
generic brochure with a receipt for contributions on the back.
48. See Muir, supra note 12, at 35.
49. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 714 (citing MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2)(c)).
50. Id. at 707 & n.198 (citing Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm'n, Administrative Office of the
Courts, Op. JE-42 (1983)).

51. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 371 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT.
RULE 81 (Supp. 1985).
52. What are the Boundaries of Proper Judicial Campaign Conduct?, JUD. CONDUCT
REP., vol. 6, no. 1, at 5, 6 (1984).
53. For example, the main purpose behind preventing judges from soliciting contributions
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C.

Committee Provision Falls Short of Its Goal

While the provision of the Code requiring non-disclosure is
defeated by state statutes requiring disclosure, the goal of shielding
candidates from contributors through committees is defeated by reality. Committees have failed to insulate judges from the strains and
politics of judicial elections.
An anecdote best illustrates how the rules are ineffectual in
shielding judges from the election process. In one instance, a Florida
judge delivered a tirade against an attorney during trial because the
attorney had opposed her election to a higher court.' While the
judge was removed from the case,55 the instance points to how the
system fails. Since the judge was obviously aware of who her opponents were, it is likely that she knew which attorneys supported her.
Furthermore, although in this case the judge's hostility was overt, it
would have been worse if she had concealed it.
This incident clearly shows that committees and the suggestion
of non-disclosure fail to prevent conflicts of interest. Judicial candidates cannot disentangle themselves from the financial aspects of a
campaign, even with an effective committee as a shield. 6 Unintentionally, the candidate will inevitably learn the identities of contributors. 7 Campaign volunteers and committee members often make
contributions.58 Supporters seen at fund-raisers, news coverage of
fund-raisers in high-profile races, and general discussion all serve to
notify candidates of the sources of their financial support.5 9
D. Arguments Against Attorney Contributions
A candidate for judicial office "must raise funds for his campaign yet remain free from any appearance of impropriety or influ-

themselves is to prevent them from knowing who their contributors are. However, by allowing candidates to refer prospective contributors to their committees, candidates are permitted
to know who is contributing to their campaign funds.
54. See Breakstone v. Mackenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(discussing the facts of McDermott v. Grossman, 429 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
55. Id.
56. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10, 14
(1976).
57. See id
58. Banner, supra note 37, at 472-73.
59. Id. One judge has suggested that contributors would not contribute if they did not
think the judge would find out their identity. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 393.
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ence by those who have contributed to his campaign." 6 However, it
is unrealistic to presume that a candidate will not personally solicit or
accept contributions, and will not learn the names of his contributors. 61 Even the most ethically conducted campaigns involve a series
of exceptions to the Canons that warp their spirit and add nothing to
the public respect for our judicial system.62
Campaign fund-raising ties judges to a political process in which
they should not take part. As Canon 1 states, "[a]n independent and
honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society." 63 "The
judiciary should remain an apolitical institution separate and distinct
from the political branches of government," and free from the tainting
aura of political favoritism.' The judiciary would be better able to
perform its function if it were free from the pressures of financial
support. 65 "It is ... impossible for a judge to accept money to
meet ... campaign expenses without losing at least some of his
impartiality. ' ' 6
The independence of sitting judges is further compromised by
their need for financial support at election time, particularly when that
support comes from attorneys.67 Accepting campaign contributions
from attorneys works against the ideal of an impartial judiciary.68

60. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 354.
61. Ud at 363. A survey showed that 46% of judges polled felt that they should not
know who contributed to their campaigns. Id. at 393. This might suggest that they think it
will influence judges. The fact that 54% of those surveyed felt they should know who
contributed raises concerns about whether these candidates make any effort, or at least do not
make their best effort, to keep contributors anonymous.
62. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 354.
63. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 1."Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
64. Papier, supra note 28, at 750-51.
65. Id. at 755. However, the need for financial support may not be as great as it is
made out to be. One successful candidate decided, after campaigning for several months, that
it was unlikely that the electorate would ever become informed about judicial candidates or
the offices to which they aspire. Spaeth, supra note 56, at 11. He concluded that his successful campaign was more connected to his party affiliation, the help of party faithfuls, his
ethnic makeup, and the ethnic makeup of those already sitting on the bench, than to his
campaign. Id, at 14-16, 18.
66. Spaeth, supra note 56, at 14.
67. Papier, supra note 28, at 748. However, one judge suggests that if anything, subconsciously, he bends over backwards to be fair to the non-contributor, to the point that he
may actually be biased against the contributor. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 403.
68. See Spaeth, supra note 56, at 14. In addition to raising questions of impartiality,
allowing attorney contributions leaves attorneys susceptible to pressure from judges to contribute. Andrew L. Johnson, Lawyer Judicial Campaign Contributions Revisited, 50 CLEV. BJ. 2
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Judges themselves admit that the presence of contributors before them
causes a certain tension.69 A contribution of any size might affect
the professional relationship that should exist between a lawyer and a
70
judge.
Serious doubt is cast upon the motives of attorneys who contribute to judicial campaigns?' While lawyers claim that they contribute
to elect a higher quality judiciary, substantial contributions are made
to judges who are running unopposed, who are certain winners, and
who are certain losers.7 2 Contributions are often sent to both sides in
a race, or to the winner after the election. 7' Furthermore, particular
types of attorneys stand to gain if judges are elected who are more
sympathetic to the kinds of clients that they represent.74
In light of such practices, it is no wonder that people question
the motives behind attorney contributions. "The idea is to further the
giver's goal-to curry favor with the judge."75 "It's a form of bribery." 76 While these are some comments that have been made by the
general public, attorneys, too, have their doubts about such contributions.77 As a response, lawyers often feel pressured to contribute in
order to level the playing field.
However, attorneys countering other attorneys' contributions with
contributions of their own is not the solution to the potentially cor-

(1978). Thus, coercive behavior may flow in both directions.
69. See Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 402. "[Bt makes me feel uncomfortable
dealing with them in court. Perhaps it would be better if we didn't know where the contributions came from." Il
70. Spaeth, supra note 56, at 14. This practice may be subject to evils other than to
partiality on the bench. In one case, a judge took the contributions from attorneys and
litigants and appropriated them for his own personal use. In re Certo, N.Y. Comm. of Jud.
Conduct, Dec. 28, 1982 (unreported determination). The judge was found to have undermined
the public confidence in the judiciary by such misappropriation. Id. The issue of the use of
excess funds also raises certain ethical questions. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 361.
71. Grannis, supra note 16, at 402-03.
72. Shaman, supra note 14.
73. Grannis, supra note 16, at 408.
74. Banner, supra note 37, at 458 (pointing out that plaintiffs' attorneys win more cases
if judges are sympathetic to accident victims). In one instance, an attorney financed a
challenger's victorious campaign after losing a large verdict in the incumbent's court. AfterId. at
I"
wards, he boasted, "I think that message has gotten across pretty substantially ....
460.
75. Baum, supra note 6, at 258.
76. Id.
77. It. "My client knew that the opposing lawyer contributed $400 to the judge's
campaign. My client does not believe the judge called the shots impartially. He is angry with
me for not having moved to disqualify the judge. Every close call went against us. I have
some doubts myself." Id.
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rupting influence of attorney contributions to judges. Instead, serious
effort in regulating judicial elections is needed. "There can be little
doubt that a state has a compelling interest in preserving the democratic process and insuring fair elections ... ."7' A state also has an
obligation under the Constitution to insure a fair trial to litigants in
our nation's courts.79 The judicial system and the right to a fair trial
must be insulated from crude forms of political pressure. 0 While
depriving judges of attorneys' contributions might appear onerous, the
Code expresses that judges must expect to be subject to restrictions
that might be considered burdensome to ordinary citizens.8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that certain infringements on First
when the state interest is the presAmendment rights are permissible
82
ervation of fair elections.
E. Blatant Abuses of the Present System
While it would be unfair and inaccurate to suggest that all contributions by attorneys to judges, or even a substantial number thereof, are tainted, some serious abuses of the system have occurred. 3
Generally speaking, the most offensive conduct that has been
permitted has occurred in Texas. In Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co.,8 5 lead counsel for Pennzoil donated $10,000 to the trial judge's
campaign only two days after filing an answer with the judge,86 and
also served on the judge's steering committee.8 7 To make matters
worse, the attorney was a liberal Democrat, while the judge was a
conservative Republican.88 The court held that this did not create the

78. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704, 712 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
79. See generally Grannis, supra note 16.
80. Papier, supra note 28, at 765.
81. See CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 2A commentary.
82. See Stoner, 379 F. Supp. at 712.
83. Note that, for restrictions on campaign conduct to be valid, there need not be a
showing that all parties who are, in fact, restricted need to be restricted. Stoner, 379 F. Supp.
at 712-13.
84. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that the reason
why Texas has the worst record is the high cost of its state-wide campaigns. L.A. DAILY J.,
Dec. 24, 1987, at 4. The system puts judges at the mercy of attorneys for money. This has
led to "shameless" conduct by both attorneys and judges. Texas judges have become too
beholden to attorney contributors to give fair hearings to the attorney's opponents. IM.
85. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Grannis, supra note 16, at 404.
87. See J-IV Inv. v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990).
88. Banner, supra note 37, at 451 n.14.
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appearance of impropriety.89 The questionable donations did not stop
at the trial level. Representatives of Texaco donated $72,700 to seven
justices on the Texas Supreme Court, which was hearing the appeal. 9' Attorneys for Pennzoil, in turn, donated more than $315,000
to the justices. 9' The case resulted in an award of $10.53 billion to
Pennzoil.
While Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. was litigation of gargantuan
proportions, such apparently unethical behavior also occurs in smaller
cases, such as J-IV Investments v. David Lynn Machine, Inc.93 In
that case, the jury found for the plaintiff, finding the defendant liable
for fraud. The defendant filed for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Before the judge had made a decision on the motion, the
defendant's counsel made a contribution to the judge's re-election
campaign. Two months later, the judge granted the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant. The higher court held that
retroactive recusal was not required as a result of the contribution,
stating that the Texas courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that
campaign contributions create the impression of bias.'
Certainly, Texas is not the only jurisdiction where the policy of
permitting attorney contributions to judges has gone astray. In a
Michigan case, a judge personally contacted attorneys for the purpose
of soliciting campaign contributions, disregarding the prohibition from
doing so, but assured them that it would have no impact on their
cases. 95 His punishment was a public reprimand. 96 In an unreported
89. J-IV Inv., 784 S.W.2d at 108 (discussing Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d at 842-44).
90. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 671.
91. Id Three of the Justices were not even up for re-election. Id. Pennzoil won the
suit, though no direct connection is drawn to the contributions. Banner, supra note 37, at 451
n.14.
92. See Shaman, supra note 14. This is the largest award in the history of the United
States. Id Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the parties settled for $3 billion. L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 24, 1987 at 4. Joe Jamail, Pennzoil's attorney, is estimated to have received
$600 million as his fee. Id. It would appear that he had a large stake in the outcome.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Hill, Texas's highest justice, resigned to begin a campaign to
reform the manner by which Texas selected its judiciary. Id.; Banner, supra note 37, at 45354 n.25.
93. J-IV Inv., 784 S.W.2d at 107.
94. Id Note that the significance of the decision becomes even greater when considering
the extreme rarity of granting a jnov.
In another recent case from Texas, an attorney contributed over 21% of a judicial
candidate's campaign fund, and the election celebration was held in the attorney's office.
Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (en banc). Despite this close relationship, opposing counsel was unable to have the judge removed from a case in which the
contributing attorney was involved. Id.
95. In re Hotchkiss, 327 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1982).
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Alabama case, a judge kept a "hit list" of all the attorneys and firms
that supported his opponent.97 The judge denied all of these
attorneys' motions for recusal when they appeared before him.
Though the judge was ultimately suspended, the case illustrates the
dangers of permitting such contributions.9 8
While these are extreme examples, and there is no indication that
such behavior is pervasive, they do suggest that a substantial danger
exists that both judges and attorneys abuse the system on a more
subtle level.
F. An Uncertain Standard
One frequent complaint by the judicial community is that the
standards that they are expected to follow are very unclear." One
reason is that the Code contains many terms and provisions without
clear definitions or standards. Another reason for the lack of clear
guidelines for judges is that attorneys fear the consequences of challenging a judge, and often choose to let pass potentially unethical
behavior." °
One example of the Code's lack of a clear definition is found in
the words "appearance of impropriety." The "appearance of impropriety" is an uncertain standard, and at least one commentator has argued that judges should be provided with a solid definition so that
they can maintain the appropriate level of conduct required by those
words."' The absence of clear standards makes the judge's conscience crucial in preventing controversies that sometimes arise over a
judge's objectivity.' 2 Unlike the Code of Professional Responsibility
for lawyers, the Code of Judicial Conduct lacks a detailed commentary to guide judges." 3 Some have called for advisory opinions so
that judges have some place to turn with questions of ethics before
charges are filed."°

96. Id.
97. In re Epperson, COJ-19 (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary, Feb. 23, 1987) (unreported
decision).
98. See id,
99. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
100. Muir, supra note 12, at 36.
101. Robert Spire, Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L. REV. 454, 455-57 (1987) (The author is
the Attorney General of Nebraska.).
102. Muir, supra note 12, at 36.
103. Macmanus, supra note 15, at 2-3.
104. John Flynn Rooney, Ethics Advisory Opinions for Judges Urged, CmH.DAILY LAW
BULL., Sept. 8, 1988, at 1. Some efforts have been made to deal with ethical questions. For

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/6

14

Siciliano: Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appear
1991]

ATTORNEY CONTRIBUTIONS IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

While many attorneys are reluctant to challenge judges' conduct,
cases have been brought. These cases offer some clue, though sometimes confused, as to what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior on
the part of judges. In one case, a judge was sanctioned for appointing
members of his former firm to represent indigent parties before the
court at the public's expense. 0 5 The judge also appointed an attorney who had given him free legal services."° Another judge was
sanctioned for accepting a loan from an attorney, even though it
would have been permissible if the check had been made out to his
committee, the attorney never personally appeared before the judge,
and the judge offered to recuse himself in the four cases involving
the lender's firm. 07 In 1987, the Texas Commission on Judicial
Conduct, for the first time in its twenty-two year history, reprimanded
a Supreme Court justice.' The justice had singled out two cases
upon the request of an attorney who had made a $20,000 contribution
to his campaign, while cases were supposed to be transferred on work
load."' It is important to note that, as a general rule,1 ° hearing
the case of a contributor is not a violation of the Code,"' nor is
hearing a case of a potential opponent or his family members."'
It appears from the above discussion that actual misuse of the

example, the Los Angeles Bar Association set up an Election Committee to respond to
complaints against the candidates within seventy-two hours. State News, supra note 16, at 5.
The committee would make recommendations within seven days, releasing them to the
candidates and the media. Id.
It should be noted that, in drafting the 1990 Code, the A.B.A. expanded the commentary, included a Terminology section, and advocated the establishment of advisory boards. See
CODE. However, both the commentaries and the Terminolgy section remain inadequate, and
the suggestion of advisory boards is not actually part of the Code.
105. In re Lawrence, 335 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Mich. 1983) (holding that appointments
were prejudicial to the administration of justice).
106. Id at 459 (noting that such appointments created the appearance of a quid pro
quo).
107. In re Lane, 535 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1989).
108. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Texas Supreme Court Justices Publicly Reprimanded, Admonished, Ju. CONDUCT REP., vol. 9, nos. 1-2, at 1 (1987).
109. Id. In addition, the justice's staff was also cited for unethical behavior. Id. at 6. It
has been suggested that a code of conduct be drafted for officers of the court. They are
presently covered under the same code as judges. CODE, supra note 1, at Application of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
110. This is the general rule. A rare deviation from this rule is discussed infra notes
139-55 and accompanying text.
111. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 714.
112. Pierce v. Charity Hosp., 550 So. 2d 211 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (attorney and judge's
spouse had both been considering running for the same position, and had both wanted the
same law firm to run their campaign).
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powers given to the court is required before a judge is considered to
have acted inappropriately. On the other hand, the potential for bias is
not enough, absent actual proof, to challenge successfully the actions
of a judge.
1Il.

IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED

It is clear that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct falls short in
many areas regarding judicial elections. It is not possible to shield
judges effectively from the identities of the sources of their contributions. Furthermore, attorney contributions at best create the appearance
of impropriety and, at worst, amount to buying the influence of judges.
Realistic provisions need to be implemented to remedy the problems of attorney contributions to judicial campaigns. Many proposals
have been suggested to reduce the influence or potential conflicts
arising from attorney contributions, and some have even been implemented. In particular, there are two plans that would best solve the
problems of attorney contributions to judicial candidates. The first
recommendation is that judges should recuse themselves when a contributing attorney appears before them. The second recommendation is
to prohibit attorney contributions altogether.
A.

Some Suggestions

Several plans have been offered to deal with the problems of
judicial elections and fund-raising. Some work to shield candidates
from the knowledge of the identities of the sources of their funds, or
to relieve the pressure in obtaining those funds. Some offer a change
in the entire manner by which we select judges.
One proposal that has been offered is the establishment of a trust
fund that would accept attorney contributions and pass them on to
candidates without revealing the sources."l This plan was proposed
in Dade County, Florida (The Dade Judicial Trust Fund)'14 and in
Detroit, Michigan (The Fair Plan). 1 5 The two plans called for attor-

113. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 364. It has also been proposed that attorney
contributions be limited to a certain amount and channeled through the bar association.
Johnson, supra note 68, at 2-3. For a more complete discussion of this proposal, see Banner,
supra note 37, at 476-78.
114. Gerald F. Richman, A New Solution to an Old Problem: The Dade Judicial Trust
Fund, 50 FLA. B.J. 478 (1986).
115. Barbara Schulert, 'Fair Plan' for Campaign Gifts Delayed in Detroit, 60 JUDICA-
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neys to make, and for judges to receive, contributions only through
the trust funds." 6 Under the Fair Plan, attorneys could earmark contributions to specific candidates, something not permitted under the
Dade Judicial Trust Fund." 7 While enthusiastically endorsed, both
plans ultimately failed."- After two elections, interest in the Dade
plan dropped off. The Fair Plan was never implemented due to problems with the Internal Revenue Service." 9
Another proposal involves public financing of judicial campaigns. 2 ' Public financing would eliminate the appearance of impropriety and the possible conflict of interest of contributor' appearing
before a judge.' 2 ' It would also open the door to more candidates,
since, funding would be available to all official candidates, not just
those with the necessary connections or their own small fortunes with
which to finance a campaign. 22 Such a plan could be funded
through a tax checkoff as is used for presidential elections.12
Retention elections have also been suggested as a means of
reducing the need for judicial candidates to turn to attorneys for campaign funds, and as a way of removing many of the political factors
from judicial campaigns. 2 4 Rather than have to run for re-election
against an opponent, judges would only have to be approved by a
certain percentage of the electorate to remain in office.'25 In effect,
the judge would be running only against his own record. Consequent-

TUPE 194 (1976).

116. Baum, supra note 6, at 258; Robert A. White, New Approach to FinancingJudicial
Campaigns, 59 A.B.A.J. 1429 (1973). The plan was carried out on a voluntary basis. IL The
Dade plan also had a requirement that a judicial candidate be approved by members of the
bar to receive funds. Id.
The plan was supposed to encourage qualified candidates to run by providing money.
It was supposed to offer an alternative to a system that demeans the judicial office by
forcing candidates to solicit from attorneys, and to eliminate the justifiable suspicion that is
generated by lawyei contributors appearing before judges. Id. at 1430.
117. Schulert, supra note 115, at 194.
118. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 364.
119. Schulert, supra note 115, at 194.
120. Banner, supra note 37, at 478.
121. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 399.
122. Id. Some sort of standard, such as a specified number of signatures from registered
voters, would have to be implemented to detennine whether someone was entitled to public
financing.
123. d; Banner, supra note 37, at 478. However, such a proposal would be extremely
expensive and the public might not support it. Id.
124. Papier, supra note 28, at 754.
125. Id. at 749-50. An analogy can be made to a Prime Minister's "vote of confidence"
in a parliamentary system such as those of Great Britain and France.
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ly, judgest would not need to raise as much money as in a contested
election. "6
A strong argument can also be made for a merit selection system. Several variations on this idea have been offered. Probably, the
most popular is the Missouri Plan. 2 7 Under that proposal, a nonpartisan committee of judges, lawyers and lay-persons would produce
a list of candidates and send it to an appointive power. Once appointed, the judge would face a retention election after a term of a
certain number of years. 29 A variation of this plan would require
the electorate to approve the appointment before the appointed judge
took office.'"
All of the above proposals, except the trust funds, work to reduce not only the likelihood of judicial impropriety from attorney
contributions, but also other potential sources of impropriety. They
also manage to keep the democratic process a part of the selection or
maintenance of the judiciary.
B.

Recusal as a Solution

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, recusal is required if a
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' The line that
determines when recusal is required and when it is not required is
very fine.
Generally, it seems that recusal is most often required if an
attorney is involved in proceedings to which the judge is a party.
This is true whether the attorney is working for or against the judge.
Recusal has been required when the judge's attorney appears before
the judge.'32 It has also been required if any attorney is participat-

126. However, this is not always true. For example, a highly publicized and expensive
campaign was successfully run to oust the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,
Rose Bird. Mary Ann Galante, California Justices Face Own 'Executions,' NAT'L. LJ., Nov.
3, 1986, at 1.
127. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 367.
128. Id The appointive power could be the governor or legislature.
129. Id
130. Spaeth, supra note 56, at 19-20.
131. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 3E(I). -A judge should disqualify himself or herself

in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.- IM In one
case, Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter recused himself from a case involving a challenge to
the practice of radio broadcasting on public buses. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 466-67 (1952). Frankfurter was so bothered by the practice that he feared his subcon-

scious feelings might have an impact on his final judgment. Id
132. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 702. However, this attorney-client relationship
generally is not considered to last ad itifitnitun. See id. at 703.
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ing in the judge's impeachment proceedings. 33 However, in one set
of circumstances, a judge might be required to recuse himself even
though the attorney is not involved in any proceedings involving the
judge. This strict rule is applied where a judge and an attorney have
a running feud.'"
However, the potential for favoritism by itself is generally not
enough to require recusal. 135 Personal friendship with a judge is not
sufficient grounds 'for involuntary recusal. 136 Nor is it required when
an announced candidate appears before an incumbent judge.'37 Until
1989, no opinion had ever stated that a 38contribution by an attorney
was sufficient in itself to require recusal.'
C.

Breakstone v. Mackenzie

In September of 1989, in a landmark decision, a Florida appellate court held that a $500 contribution by counsel to the judge's
spouse's judicial campaign was a reasonable basis for the opposing
party to fear prejudice, and was legally sufficient grounds to disqualify the trial judge from the case."' The fact that the contribution
was to the judge's spouse did not lessen the fear.' The court's decision "properly elevates reality above theoretical nicety .... In the
real world the facts of these cases ... would give the appearance of
partiality-justifying a recusal-notwithstanding the judge's genuine
ability to maintain neutrality."' 4 '

133. Muir, supra note 12, at 36.
134. Id. at 36-37 (noting that such a feud must be well documented in the motion for
recusal).

135. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
136. Muir, supra note 12, at 36.
137. Id. at 35 (citing Parsons v. Motor Home of Am., 465 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
138. See Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 702. See infra notes 139-55 and accompanying text. In amending the Code in 1990, the A.B.A., for the first time, suggested that attorney contributions may be relevant in disqualification uner Canon 3E. CODE, supra note 1, at
Canon 5C(2) commentary.
139. Breakstone v. Mackenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Muir,
supra note 12, at 34. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that a $500 contribution created legally sufficient grounds to disqualify a trial judge,
but upheld its order disqualifying the trial judge under the particular facts of the case.
Mackenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990).
140. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1169.
141. Id. at 1173 (Ferguson, 3., concurring). This "may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias . . . . But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.'" In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (quoting
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
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The Breakstone holding extends to situations in which a litigant
or an attorney at bar has contributed $500 or more to the campaign
of a judge or a close relative of the judge.' This holding neither
requires the judge to disclose the fact that a campaign supporter is
appearing before him, nor suggests that the judge must disqualify
himself in all of the contributor's firm's cases."4' In addition, the
holding is restricted to cases in which counsel moves for recusal.'"
The court's comprehensive decision stated that no judge, under
any circumstances, is warranted in presiding over a trial if there is
even a question as to his neutrality.145 If the attested facts are reasonably sufficient, it is not for the trial judge to say that they are
not. 46 The disqualification procedure is designed to assure the appearance and reality of impartial adjudication.' 47 This procedure is
enhanced by disclosure requirements that let the electorate know who
so that it can decide any actual or potential
made what contribution
148
conflicts of interest.
The court was concerned with the possibility of quid pro quo
relations and the creation of the appearance of influence or corruption. 149 The issue is not one of policy but, rather, of the right to a
fair trial.'" Concern for such a right constitutes a compelling state
interest, which permits the abridgement of fundamental First Amendment rights."' The court went on to challenge suggestions that this
would have a chilling effect on contributions and support, saying that
it defied both logic and experience.' 52
The Breakstone decision departs from earlier Florida decisions
that had suggested that a judge's impartiality would survive a camIt is also inconsistent with an Ethics
paign contribution.'

142. Muir, supra note 12, at 34.
143. Xd at 37.
144. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1173.
145. Id. at 1167.
146. Id at 1167-68 (holding that, as long as the attested facts are not frivolous, they are
sufficient).
147. Id at 1168. This helps in -avoiding the undesirable situation which could be
presented by inquiry into the existence of an actual prejudice." Id
148. See Id. at 1171.
149. Id at 1168.
150. Id at 1172.
151. Id. at 1168; see also infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
152. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1172; Muir, supra note 12, at 34.
153. Muir, supra note 12, at 34-35. See Maexcelso Compania Naviera v. Florida Nat'l
Bank, 533 So. 2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Raybon v. Burnette, 135 So. 2d 228 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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Committee's unanimous decision that a judge need not recuse himself
when a supporter is before him." However, the court noted that
perceptions of legal ethics have undergone a dramatic evolution to a
stricter standard over the past thirty years.'55 While the Florida Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with the Court of Appeals,
Breakstone v. Mackenzie represents an historic recognition of that
evolution on the part of the judiciary.
D. One Step Further
While Breakstone certainly raises the standard as to what meets
the "appearance of impropriety," it still falls short of the public's
expectations."5 6 However, it does provide a framework that can be
built upon to further the integrity of the judicial system. Several
improvements can be made upon the decision in Breakstone to create
a clear and effective standard of recusal when attorney contributors
appear before a recipient judge.
The essential element of a recusal rule would be disclosure. 57
It has been suggested that disclosure of contributions should be made
not only to the Secretary of State, but also to the court, so that lawyers can view the records and decide whether to make a motion for
recusal. 155 While it might not be objectionable to require the lawyer
to do the extra work and check the record himself, the judge should
be required to make the disclosure himself.' 59 In the event that the
judge is unaware of the contribution, the contributing attorney should
make the disclosure."W

154. See Muir, supra 12, at 35. The Committee also unanimously rejected a suggestion
that a judge has a duty to disclose, for the record, the identities of his contributors and
workers. Id
155. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1770.
156. See Muir, supra note 12, at 35.
157. Disclosure bears a substantial connection to preventing influence buying, favoritism
and other forms of corruption. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704, 713-14 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
One judge made a practice of informing opposing counsel that the other attorney had
contributed to his campaign and asking if he wanted the judge to recuse himself. Smoler &
Stokinger, supra note 3, at 403. He said that counsel usually refused the offer, thinking that
the judge would bend over backwards in their favor. Id.
158.

Macmanus, supra note 15, at 3.

159. This would ensure that the relationship is out in the open, and would work toward
ensuring public confidence in the system. Otherwise, judges might be able to hide behind the
possibility that the attorney did not check the record.
160. The reason for this is that the judge could say he was unaware of the contribution
and thus did not disclose it. This would be difficult to prove. Requiring the attorney to also
disclose the contribution ensures that the relationship is revealed.
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Once the disclosure has been made, regardless of the size of the
contribution, 6 ' the burden should be on the opposing counsel to
move for recusal. However, the opponent might find no problem with
the contribution, and consent to the judge's sitting on the case. 62
Thus, recusal should not be required sua sponte, 63 nor once disclosure has occurred, per se. However, once the motion has been made,
recusal should be per se required."6 The option to move for recusal
should also be open to attorneys who were supporters of the judge's
opponent.' 65 However, if the campaign is active at the time of the
appearance, the judge should automatically be disqualified from hearing the
case, the appearance of impropriety being too great to dis66
pel.1
The above suggestions should be applied when the attorney has
been a contributor in the past. The rule should apply for one election
cycle after the contribution. 67 In addition, it should apply to those
who have actively supported the judge-that is to say, campaigned or
solicited contributions for him,68 as well as to those who have contributed money to his campaign.

161. It has been suggested that recusal should be required only for large contributions
and contributions that are given with the intent of influencing the judge. Banner, supra note
37, at 450. However, a dollar limit would be arbitrary, and proving the intent behind a
contribution would be extremely difficult to establish.
162. This would be similar to the requirement that a judge must disclose and recuse
himself from a case in which his attorney appears, but may continue upon opponent's
consent. See Alfini & Brooks, supra note 2, at 702.
163. Breakstone v. Mackenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
164. It has been suggested that some prima facie case be established before some independent body, similar to those discussed supra note 104 and accompanying text. However, I
have rejected this proposal because I believe that, once the motion has been made to disqualify a judge, combined with existence of the contribution, there is a situation in which the
appearance of favoring the contributor, and disfavoring the movant, is created. The appearance is the essential aspect.
It has been suggested that if one of the other parties may be prejudiced by the
judge's disqualification, he need not step aside. Smoler & Stokinger, supra note 3, at 408.
165, Attorneys who opposed a judge might be prejudiced more than those who supported
the judge might be favored. See supra notes 54-55, 97-98 and accompanying text.

166. But see J-IV Inv. v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990). The timing of a contribution may be a major factor in determining impropriety.
Contributions during the election with a case pending, or after the election is already won, or
far in advance of a re-election all raise serious suspicions of intent. Grannis, supra note 16,

at 404.
167. Banner, supra note 37, at 488.
168. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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E. Criticisms of Recusal
While recusal might appear to be a simple solution to the problem of attorney contributions to judicial campaigns, there are arguments against it. The arguments against recusal are based on practicality as well as the absence of a need for a policy of recusal. A
common charge is that a judge will not be biased because of small
donations to his campaign and, thus, should not be required to recuse
himself from such cases. 69 It is argued that when a popular judge
receives many small contributions from members of the bar, the judge
will be disqualified in practically all cases that come before him,
unless he presides in a large city. 7 Opponents claim that the administrative burden would be too great and the "Rule of Necessity"
would end the question of recusal.171 Another argument against
recusal is that attorneys will have an incentive to contribute to the
opponents of a judge whom they do not like so that they can force
the judge off their cases."7
However, these charges argue against themselves. If enough
attorneys in a small community contribute to the same judge, the
attorneys are not going to make a motion for recusal. There is no
threat of prejudice if they have all contributed. Furthermore, opposing
counsel needs to make the motion for recusal. If opposing counsel
does not believe that a $25 contribution will prejudice his client, he
will not make the motion. 73
F.

Prohibitionof Attorney Contributions

The most straightforward solution to eliminating potential bias
resulting from attorneys' contributions to judicial candidates would be
simply to prohibit attorney contributions. 74 Such prohibitions have

169. Banner, supra note 37, at 482.
170. Macmans, supra note 15, at 3.
171. Grannis, supra note 16, at 409. The Rule of Necessity provides that even if the
judge is disqualified, he may hear the case if no determination could otherwise be had. Thus,
it is argued that disqualification would result so often because of past political support, that
the Rule of Necessity would lead to the judge's hearing the case anyway. Id.
172. Banner, supra note 37, at 488. I must admit that I have no solution at this time to
this argument against the policy of recusal.
173. Many attorneys feel great pressure to contribute to a judge's campaign. Grannis,
supra note 16, at 408 (discussing several lawyers who considered a $1,000 contribution to be
all but required). If this is the case, opposing counsel will not look at the contribution as an
attempt to buy favor with the judge, and thus will not make a motion.
174. Baum, supra note 6, at 258.
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been implemented in some jurisdictions and successfully enforced. 75
However, a policy of prohibiting attorney contributions might be
subject76 to a constitutional challenge that it violates the First Amendment.
Courts have, however, upheld other campaign restrictions that
appeared similarly burdensome. Among them are ceilings on individual contributions, 1" requirements that judges resign to run for another office, 178 restrictions on federal civil servants' qualifications as
partisan candidates for public office, 179 and restrictions on state civil
servants' qualifications to run for any paid public office. 80
G. The Constitutional Test
Courts have employed a two-tier test to determine whether or not
a statutory restriction on campaign activities violates the First Amendment. First, there must be a significant and compelling state interest
sought to be served by the statute.' 8 ' Second, the means chosen to
further that interest must not unnecessarily infringe on First Amendment rights.'8 ' A rule prohibiting attorney contributions might be
able to pass both tiers.
Certainly, ensuring the administration of an evenhanded judicial
system is a compelling state interest. If anything, there is a greater
interest in ensuring fair trials than in protecting the integrity of civil
servants by forbidding them from running for public office.'
In
fact, courts have held that preventing judicial abuse of office and
eliminating even the appearance of impropriety are valid state interests that justify a curtailment of First Amendment rights." While

175. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 2. This policy was later withdrawn. Id.
176. Baum, supra note 6, at 258. In addition, prohibiting attorney contributions would
give special interest groups greater influence in judicial elections. Id.
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding a $1,000 ceiling on individual
contributions). While Buckley was not about judicial elections, some of its issues apply to
judicial election regulations. See Grannis, supra note 16, at 411-12.
178. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977).
179. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973).
180. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
181. Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704, 712 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Grannis, supra note 16,
at 412 (discussing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
182. Stoner, 379 F. Supp. at 712; Grannis, supra note 16, at 412.
183. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601; United States Civil Serv. Comn'n, 413 U.S. 548. The
integrity of civil servants is a vague concept. On the other hand, the right to a fair trial is
one of the fundamental, bedrock rights of the Constitution of the United States.
184. See Morial, 565 F.2d at 302-03 (the threat of possible judicial abuse justified
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judicial bias resulting from attorney contributions is usually viewed as
an ethical question, it also is a constitutional question of due process
and the right to a fair trial. 85
There is also a sufficient nexus between prohibiting attorney
contributions and insuring an impartial judiciary. As has been discussed in earlier parts of this Note, attorney contributions possess
significant potential to infringe on the right to a fair trial. 1 6 Consequently, prohibiting attorney contributions would logically work to
reduce potential sources of bias. Furthermore, this nexus appears to
be greater than that between not allowing civil servants to run for
elected office and the preservation
of their integrity, which has been
87
nexus.1
sufficient
a
held to be
Finally, prohibiting attorneys' contributions does not unnecessarily infringe upon attorneys' First Amendment rights. Certainly, the
right to run for public office is one of the ultimate forms of expression, yet restricting that right has repeatedly been held not to infringe
unnecessarily on First Amendment rights.' The right to make monetary contributions to a candidate is a lesser form of expression than
is running for public office. Prohibiting attorney contributions does
not burden the right to vote or to speak. 9 More importantly, it
does not penalize any particular point of view. 19t Furthermore, other
avenues of speech and assistance remain open to attorneys.' 9' Finally, an argument can be made that prohibiting attorney contributions
actually protects attorneys from pressures that judges may put on
them for contributions, rather than infringe upon their right of

requiring judges running for another office to resign from the bench).
185. Grannis, supra note 16, at 383.
186. See supra notes 60-98 and accompanying text. Where the practice possesses a
substantial connection to unethical behavior like influence-buying and favoritism, infringements
on First Amendment rights are permissible. See Stoner, 379 F. Supp. at 713-14 (discussing
disclosure requirements).
187. If anything, running for public office seems to be a higher form of public service
than being a civil servant, and thus the integrity of the civil service would be enhanced by
its members seeking such higher positions.
188. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601; United States Civil Serv. Colmn'n, 413 U.S. 548; Morial,
565 F.2d at 301.
189. See Modal, 565 F.2d at 301 (holding that a law requiring that judges resign before
running for new political positions does not infringe on candidates' political rights).
190. See id. No candidate or attorney of a particular viewpoint is being deprived of any
rights. All lawyers and all judicial candidates are affected. Id. at 302.
Also note that because judicial offices are different from other offices, the state may
regulate judges with that difference in mind without violating the Equal Protection Clause. Ie
at 304-06.
191. Johnson, supra note 68, at 2.
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speech.'92
While prohibiting attorney contributions might seem to be unfair
to both lawyers and judges, this might simply be a price that one
must pay to be a member of the legal community. Both judges and
lawyers are subject to ethical codes193 to which most other professions are not subject. As professionals in a system to which people
turn for justice, they must uphold and adhere to standards of conduct
that might be burdensome to other citizens."9 Furthermore, judges
in most jurisdictions are already prohibited from making contributions
to political organizations and candidates.' 95 Prohibiting attorney contributions to judicial candidates is neither more onerous nor any more
of an infringement on the First Amendment rights of attorneys. Although a more detailed constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of
this Note, it is likely that a prohibition on attorney contributions
could withstand a constitutional challenge.
CONCLUSION

This Note has discussed the potential dangers, both great and
slight, that exist by permitting attorneys to contribute to judicial campaigns. While the Code calls for an independent and honorable judiciary, this goal has been achieved neither in reality nor in the
public's perception. Permitting attorneys to make campaign contributions to judges adds nothing to achieve this goal.
Breakstone serves as an encouraging sign that the judiciary is
aware that improvements need to be made, yet it falls short of its
goal. The suggestions made are intended to raise the standard one
step higher, and to make it a little more difficult to buy favor with a
judge. The prohibition on attorney contributions goes even one step
further. The compelling state interest of ensuring a fair trial, combined with the anecdotal evidence of impropriety, surely justify such
a prohibition.
Despite these recommendations and the other proposals discussed,
the process of electing judges still holds many dangers. Special inter-

192. Id.
193. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY; CODE, supra note 1.
194. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 2A commentary.
195. 1984 CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 7A(I)(C) (except as provided for under 7A(2)).
In one case, a judge's campaign contributions to a senatorial and gubernatorial candidate
violated 7A(I)(C) and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Wright, 329
S.E,2d 668 (N.C. 1985). The court held that a campaign committee was not the type of
political organization encompassed by the exceptions of 7A(2). Id.
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est groups and individual contributors, too, may try to buy influence
with judges. While the purpose of this Note has been to focus on
attorney contributions, these other dangers should not be ignored.
Ultimately, the best solution would be to eliminate judicial elec9
tions altogether and to follow the federal system of appointment.1 6
However, dramatic action would be required if such a plan were to
be implemented."9 Instead, this Note has focused on plans that
would be more feasible.
Bradley A. Siciliano

196. After successfully campaigning for a seat on the Pennsylvania Superior Court, one
judge concluded that judges should not be elected. Spaeth, supra note 56, at 10-13. He felt
that the electorate was just too uninformed. Id.
197. See, e.g., White, supra note 116 (stating that to change the way judges are selected
in Florida would require changing the constitution).
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